Navigating Turbulent Skies: US Military’s Small UAS Acquisition Hurdles
defense acquisition, unmanned aerial systems, Blue UAS program, DoD innovation, military drones, US Army challenges, USMC fleet expansion, GAO report, autonomous technologies, cybersecurity compliance
small UAS acquisition, Blue UAS challenges, DIU efforts, DoD standards, military UAS fleets, acquisition confusion, GAO metrics, autonomous systems production, tactical UAVs, Exception to Policy
In the ever-evolving landscape of modern warfare, where unmanned aircraft systems have become indispensable tools for reconnaissance, surveillance, and even offensive operations, the United States Department of Defense faces a complex web of challenges in acquiring and deploying small unmanned aircraft systems effectively. The Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit, established to bridge the gap between cutting-edge commercial technologies and military needs, has been at the forefront of efforts to streamline this process, yet persistent hurdles continue to impede progress. As thousands of diverse unmanned aircraft systems flood the market from both domestic and international manufacturers, the task of selecting compliant, secure, and operationally viable platforms has proven daunting for the US armed forces, particularly the Army and Marine Corps, which have encountered significant difficulties in expanding their small UAS inventories in recent years. This situation not only underscores the administrative and bureaucratic obstacles inherent in defense procurement but also raises concerns about the broader implications for national security, including the ability to rapidly scale production of autonomous systems and integrate tactically relevant unmanned aerial vehicles into frontline operations. The Blue UAS program, initiated by the Defense Innovation Unit, represents a pivotal attempt to address these issues by curating a list of pre-vetted systems that adhere to stringent Department of Defense standards, thereby alleviating the need for cumbersome exceptions to policy that traditionally slow down acquisitions. However, as industry insiders and government officials have highlighted, ambiguities surrounding the program’s evaluation criteria and vetting procedures have sown confusion, potentially undermining its effectiveness and delaying the deployment of critical capabilities to warfighters on the ground. At its core, the Blue UAS initiative aims to reduce the administrative burden on end-users by providing a streamlined pathway for procurement, eliminating the requirement for officials to secure an Exception to Policy for purchasing small unmanned aircraft systems, as outlined on the Defense Innovation Unit’s official resources. This approach is positioned as the fastest and most cost-effective method for integrating small UAS into Department of Defense operations, yet determining whether it truly achieves these objectives remains elusive due to a lack of comprehensive performance metrics. A recent Government Accountability Office report, released in February 2025, sheds light on these shortcomings, revealing that the Defense Innovation Unit struggles to internally evaluate its impact on the Department of Defense’s capacity to deliver innovative technologies to service members. The report emphasizes that while Defense Innovation Unit officials have expressed intentions to establish clear metrics and goals in the near future, the current absence of such benchmarks makes it exceedingly difficult to measure the program’s success or identify areas for improvement. This gap in assessment capabilities is particularly troubling given the strategic imperative to ramp up the production and fielding of autonomous systems, as conflicts around the world demonstrate the transformative role of small unmanned aircraft systems in asymmetric warfare. For instance, in ongoing operations, small UAS have proven invaluable for providing real-time intelligence, enhancing situational awareness, and executing precision strikes with minimal risk to personnel, yet the US military’s ability to keep pace with adversaries who rapidly adopt commercial off-the-shelf drones has been hampered by these acquisition bottlenecks. The US Army and Marine Corps, in particular, have faced protracted struggles in building up their small UAS fleets, with delays attributed to a combination of regulatory hurdles, supply chain vulnerabilities, and interoperability issues that complicate integration into existing command and control structures. Industry stakeholders have voiced frustrations over the opaque nature of the Blue UAS vetting process, which involves rigorous cybersecurity assessments, compliance with National Defense Authorization Act requirements, and evaluations by service-specific experts, but lacks transparency in how decisions are made or how vendors can appeal rejections. This opacity has led to perceptions that the program favors established players over innovative startups, potentially stifling competition and innovation in a field where agility and adaptability are paramount. Moreover, the Blue UAS program is not intended to be the sole avenue for government validation; alternatives such as programs of record and traditional Exception to Policy routes remain viable, offering flexibility but also contributing to a fragmented acquisition ecosystem that can overwhelm decision-makers. As the Department of Defense seeks to accelerate the adoption of unmanned technologies, recent updates to the Blue UAS framework, including a refresh list announced in February 2025 that incorporated 23 new platforms and 14 unique components, signal efforts to evolve and expand the program’s scope. These additions, selected through a collaborative evaluation involving over 35 platforms and input from 40 military drone end-users across various branches, underscore a commitment to incorporating warfighter feedback and addressing capability gaps. However, the transition to a two-tiered Blue UAS model, announced in May 2025, aims to enhance speed and scale by introducing an expanded Cleared List that leverages third-party validations, including the integration of Green UAS platforms which focus on non-DoD compliant but secure commercial options. This evolution reflects a recognition that the original framework may not have been sufficiently adaptable to the rapid pace of technological advancement in the unmanned sector, where adversaries like those in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated the efficacy of low-cost, swarming drones in disrupting conventional forces. The Government Accountability Office’s February 2025 report on the Defense Innovation Unit further illuminates systemic issues, recommending actions to assess progress and enhance collaboration across the Department of Defense. Specifically, the report highlights how the Defense Innovation Unit has transitioned commercial technologies for military use since its inception but lacks performance goals to quantify its contributions, such as the number of technologies fielded or the time saved in acquisition cycles. This absence of data-driven oversight not only hampers internal improvements but also complicates congressional oversight and funding allocations, as lawmakers seek assurances that investments in innovation yield tangible results. In response, Defense Innovation Unit leaders have outlined plans under their DIU 3.0 initiative to institute reforms, including clearer metrics for rapid tech acquisition and stronger partnerships with industry to mitigate risks associated with immature technologies. Yet, these promises come amid broader Department of Defense shifts, such as the recent policy changes announced in a presidential action in June 2025 aimed at unleashing American drone dominance through accelerated commercialization and integration into the national airspace system. For the US Army, the solicitation for ‘launched effects’ autonomous drones in August 2025 represents a concrete step toward fielding capabilities to every division and Multi-Domain Task Force by 2026, but it also underscores the urgency of resolving acquisition challenges to meet these ambitious timelines. Similarly, the Marine Corps has publicly acknowledged its struggles to fill the drone gap, with leaders noting deficiencies in organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that leave units vulnerable in contested environments. Colonels and generals from both services have disclosed in forums and congressional testimonies the capability gaps in small unmanned aerial systems and counter-small UAS measures, emphasizing that while the United States maintains technological superiority in high-end platforms, the proliferation of affordable commercial drones poses asymmetric threats that demand agile procurement strategies. The integration of small UAS into tactical operations remains inconsistent, with some units excelling in exercises while others grapple with training shortages, bandwidth limitations for communications, and airspace deconfliction issues that arise when operating alongside manned aircraft. These operational hurdles are compounded by the need to counter enemy unmanned systems, as evidenced by the Department of Defense’s new strategy for countering unmanned systems released in December 2024, which unifies approaches across domains and emphasizes rapid acquisition, budget flexibility, and public-private collaborations. The Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, established in 2020, plays a crucial role in this ecosystem, working toward joint solutions to mitigate the growing threat of small drones that have proliferated in conflicts from Africa to Ukraine, shifting the offense-defense balance and necessitating training programs like those at Fort Sill and Redstone Arsenal. Despite these initiatives, the Department of Defense’s historical patterns in unmanned aircraft systems acquisition reveal persistent risks, as seen in past programs like Global Hawk and Predator, which experienced cost overruns and schedule delays due to immature requirements and inadequate business cases. Lessons from these efforts stress the importance of knowledge-based, incremental strategies that prioritize warfighter needs and sustain disciplined leadership to avoid duplication, as observed in coordinated Army and Air Force programs like Warrior and Predator. Looking ahead, the Defense Innovation Unit’s Blue UAS program must continue to adapt, incorporating feedback from industry and end-users to dispel myths about UAS policy and promote greater participation from diverse vendors. By establishing robust metrics, fostering transparency in vetting, and aligning with broader Department of Defense priorities for autonomous technologies, the United States can overcome these acquisition challenges and ensure that its forces remain equipped with the most advanced small unmanned aircraft systems. This not only enhances tactical relevance on the battlefield but also safeguards against emerging threats in an era where drone warfare is no longer a niche capability but a core component of military strategy. The path forward requires a concerted effort to balance security compliance with innovation speed, ultimately enabling the ramp-up of production and deployment that is essential for maintaining strategic superiority. As global adversaries continue to leverage unmanned systems with increasing sophistication, the stakes could not be higher, demanding that the Department of Defense refine its processes to deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance, thereby empowering service members with the tools they need to succeed in dynamic and unpredictable operational environments. In delving deeper into the intricacies of these challenges, it becomes evident that the Blue UAS program’s evolution is symptomatic of larger shifts within the Department of Defense’s approach to emerging technologies. For example, the inclusion of Green UAS platforms in July 2025 expands the cleared list, clarifying certification pathways for commercial drones that may not meet full National Defense Authorization Act standards but offer value in non-sensitive applications, thus broadening the pool of available options and potentially reducing costs for training and secondary missions. This pragmatic adjustment acknowledges that not all small unmanned aircraft systems require the highest levels of cybersecurity hardening, allowing for a tiered compliance model that prioritizes risk management over blanket restrictions. Industry responses to these changes have been mixed, with some vendors praising the increased accessibility while others caution that diluting standards could introduce vulnerabilities, particularly in light of rising cyber threats from state actors who seek to exploit supply chain weaknesses in drone components. The Defense Innovation Unit’s frequently asked questions resource attempts to address such concerns by illuminating the development process of Blue UAS and promoting participation, yet ongoing dialogues with stakeholders reveal a need for more detailed guidance on how platforms are evaluated for aspects like autonomy levels, payload capacity, and endurance. Turning to specific service branch experiences, the US Army’s push for small UAS fleet expansion has been marked by initiatives like the integration of Group 2 systems, which weigh between 21 and 50 pounds and operate at altitudes under 3,500 feet, as detailed in a RAND Corporation report from April 2025 on small uncrewed aircraft systems in divisional brigades. These platforms fill critical gaps in reconnaissance for infantry units, but acquisition delays have resulted from mismatched requirements and funding shortfalls, leading to reliance on legacy systems that lack modern features like AI-driven target recognition. Similarly, the Marine Corps’ challenges are amplified in amphibious operations, where small UAS must withstand harsh maritime environments and integrate with ship-based command systems, yet reports from War on the Rocks in June 2025 highlight integration failures despite capabilities demonstrated in exercises at Camp Lejeune. Marine leaders have called for the military to “get out of its own way” on drones, advocating for faster fielding to match the pace of adversaries who deploy quadcopters en masse for swarming tactics. These sentiments echo broader critiques in outlets like Task & Purpose, which in recent analyses question how far the US military must go to catch up on drone warfare, especially following policy transformations announced to streamline acquisition and encourage experimentation. The Pentagon’s recognition of these issues is evident in the Quadrennial Defense Review’s directives to restructure programs like the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems into Navy-focused efforts for carrier-based operations, aiming to reduce duplication and foster interoperability across services. Furthermore, the emphasis on counter-unmanned aircraft systems capabilities, as outlined in congressional reports from March 2025, underscores the dual nature of the challenge: not only acquiring offensive small UAS but also defending against them through joint offices that coordinate detection, tracking, and neutralization technologies. Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine serve as real-world laboratories, where small drones have destroyed high-value assets like tanks and ships at fractions of the cost, prompting the Department of Defense to invest in replicator programs that mass-produce attritable systems. However, without resolving acquisition bottlenecks, such as those identified in the Government Accountability Office’s urgings for reforms in February 2025, these ambitions risk falling short. The report’s recommendations for establishing performance goals and enhancing collaboration are crucial, as they would enable the Defense Innovation Unit to better quantify its role in transitioning commercial drones for military use, from prototypes like the Black Widow UAV by Teal Drones to advanced swarms. In parallel, educational and training initiatives, such as those at the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft University, are vital for building operator proficiency and ensuring that every Marine or soldier can effectively employ or counter drones, as advocated in Proceedings from the U.S. Naval Institute. The convergence of these efforts points to a future where small unmanned aircraft systems are seamlessly woven into the fabric of joint operations, but achieving this requires sustained commitment to overcoming the administrative, technical, and cultural barriers that currently persist. As the United States navigates this turbulent domain, the lessons from past programs—emphasizing solid business cases, incremental development, and disciplined oversight—must inform future strategies to avoid repeating historical pitfalls of cost growth and delays. Ultimately, the success of initiatives like Blue UAS will be measured not by the number of platforms listed but by their timely delivery to the warfighter, enhancing lethality, accountability, and resilience in an increasingly unmanned battlespace. Expanding on the strategic implications, it is worth noting that the challenges in small UAS acquisition extend beyond mere procurement logistics to encompass geopolitical dimensions, where the United States’ ability to dominate the drone market influences alliances and deterrence postures. For instance, exporting vetted Blue UAS platforms to partners could strengthen collective defense, but current vetting delays hinder such opportunities, allowing competitors like China to flood global markets with cheaper alternatives that may compromise security. The White House’s June 2025 directive on unleashing American drone dominance seeks to counter this by accelerating safe commercialization and airspace integration, yet implementation hinges on resolving the very issues highlighted in the Government Accountability Office report. Industry analyses, such as those from DroneAnalyst dating back to 2021 but updated with recent trends, illustrate how military spending on UAS has surged, driven by Blue sUAS requirements, but also reveal impacts on vendors who must navigate complex compliance landscapes. To foster innovation, the Department of Defense could adopt best practices from successful transitions, like the rapid scaling of counter-UAS technologies through the Replicator program, which emphasizes flexibility and iteration. In conclusion, while the path ahead is fraught with obstacles, proactive reforms in acquisition strategies, bolstered by robust metrics and collaborative frameworks, hold the promise of transforming the US military’s small UAS capabilities into a decisive advantage on the global stage.
